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This is not the first time Richard Price has confronted issues that have been at the forefront of anthropology in the last decade, but The Convict and the Colonel may be his finest effort to date in illuminating their significance. Price raises provocative questions: How best to get at the complicated relationship of fact to fiction, truth to fantasy, past to present, and fieldwork to memories in our ethnographic accounts, while simultaneously remaining committed to those about whom we write? How to productively engage and expose our own desires and nostalgia for the past, as well as residual belief in such constructs as “authentic” culture, even after they are exposed as complicitous in the very power relations we might wish to disrupt? Price’s book, a partial history of Martinique from the 1920s to the present, is one of the best examples of how such theoretical questioning can inform ethnographic practice. Indeed, it is all that the “new ethnography,” with its call for self-reflexivity, situatedness, experimental writing, and ethical and political engagement, is supposed to be. It is a gem of a book, one that is often more evocative than explanatory. In many places it reads like a novel while simultaneously impressing upon the reader the stakes involved in getting at some “truth” about the colonial Martiniquan past, even as that past is itself understood as a “constructed fiction.”

The Convict and the Colonel is at once a recovery of that past, rumination on it, and documentation of “the process by which history is made.” At the center of these efforts is Price’s reconstruction of the life of Médard Aribot, a man some celebrate as folk artist and others remember as convict. He is valorized by many Martiniquan elders as an idiosyncratic—perhaps mad—resister of colonialism, a man who lived in caves, spent much of his time stealing from rich sugar plantation owners to give to the poor, only to be banished to Devil’s Island for his supposed role in an uprising known to locals as La Guerre du Diamant.

Price’s first chapter is a reconstruction of this election-day “war” over corrupt balloting practices. It occurred in 1925 at the “height of empire,” a moment Price characterizes as an “ambiguous” period balanced between the depth of colonial repression and the hope of a more dignified future (p. 5). It pitted the Federation Socialiste, the revolutionary Left composed primarily of the working masses dreaming of gaining that future through the franchise, against the Rightist Bloc Republican, representing the interests of the status quo: the church, colonial administration, mulatto bourgeoisie, and especially plantation owners. The Colonel de Coppens, the colonel of Price’s title, is a member of this last group. He is killed, along with about 20 others (the exact number is unclear), during the day’s explosive events.

Price presents the story of this bloodbath literally from both sides: he places official police and colonial administrative reports, letters, and telegrams in one column on the right side of the page and local fishermen’s recollections and Leftist newspaper accounts on the left side, a technique, unfortunately, that is more confusing than revealing. It is unclear who is responsible for Coppens’s death. The Right blamed the locals. Philibert, a local fisherman who witnessed the events, suggests that Coppens was shot by a colonial soldier, a Guadeloupean angered by Coppens’s denunciation of his brother. Price privileges this reconstruction, ultimately depending far more for his own interpretation on Philibert’s memories than on any other source. It is a privileging whose motivation becomes clearer later in the book when Price reveals his own stakes in a certain version of the past. It is a privileging Price allows despite the fact that other locals may have gotten another part of the story wrong: they claim that Médard was arrested for carving an effigy of Coppens that was carried through the streets by locals to insult the Colonel on the day of the elections. While it is likely that the effigy was paraded around, and while it is certain that Médard carved it, Price spends his next chapter unraveling the mystery of Médard’s arrest.

But getting Médard’s story “right” is not all that concerns Price. He is equally interested in it as an “alternative vision of the past.” He uses it to question the claim of such Caribbean writers...
as Naipaul and Walcott that “colonial education had effectively wiped out the type of historical memory that gives a people the proud and strong sense of self [Price] had found among the Saramaka,” the descendents of escaped slaves about whom he has written extensively (p. 60). Price plumbs police records, colonial reports, and local memory to reconstruct a compelling tale of colonial repression, a striking description of the brutality of life in the penal colony, and a compassionate and moving portrait of Médard, a man who resisted colonial domination through his art, his pilferage, and even, perhaps, his madness. It is a picture made all the more vivid by the inclusion of over 100 photographs throughout the text. Price ultimately concludes that Médard was arrested not for carving Coppens’s likeness, but for his thievery under the provision of a French law that cast petty criminals and their crimes as a threat to public hygiene and thus as in need of banishment in order to cleanse French society.

It is the changing role that Médard’s story has played in the historical consciousness of Martinique that concerns Price in his last chapter. He presents a complex, multilayered analysis of what he calls the “post-carding of the past.” Focusing on the contemporary appropriation of Médard’s image and of the colonial past by a tourist industry and a younger generation of créolistes, he reproves them for their celebration of “a museumified Martinique, a diorama’d Martinique, a picturesque and ‘pastified’ Martinique that promotes a ‘feel-good’ nostalgia” (p. 175). Price is critical of this nostalgia even as he recognizes the role his own nostalgia plays in his valorization of Médard as colonial resister. Price makes it clear that he longs for the Martinique he first encountered in 1962, a Martinique of fishermen who still relied on fishing magic, a Martinique of spirited café-rum shops, a Martinique still conscious of colonial oppression and inequality. It is a Martinique inextricably bound up with his youthful feelings for Sally Price, as his letters to her from the field that year in the early 1960s suggest: he was having a love affair with both the woman and the island. Perhaps then we can forgive Price his romanticizing of madness and of the struggle for equality under conditions of colonialism as well as his unwillingness to see a contemporary generation’s own stories and uses of the past as anything more than trivial. Price has written such a compelling tale that many readers will find that he can be forgiven quite a lot.


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When a Navajo girl has her first menses, the occasion is often marked with a puberty ceremony, known as the kinaaldá. In exploring the ceremony—to ascertain Navajos’ logic of cause and effect (p. 4), and what “effect” reveals “about the cultural construction of the human body and personhood” (p. 6)—Maureen Trudelle Schwarz makes a remarkable and significant contribution to Navajo studies, the study of culture as practice, and anthropological research on religion, personhood, and the body.

Following the requisite chapter on academic theory (the book was Schwarz’s dissertation), Schwarz begins to “build” the Navajo individual. She uses Navajo origin teachings to locate the “primordial elements” that comprise the individual and other living entities and, combining Navajo accounts and anthropological theory, identifies three “metaphorical structures.” First, the human is a structural “homologue,” in that she or he retains the universe’s fundamental features and structure. Second, the human is comprised of “complementary” (although to Schwarz, “contrasting”) male and female parts. Third, because of “synecdoche,” an act on a discarded portion of the individual (such as an infant’s umbilicus) affects the entire person and, hence, the “boundaries of persons” extend beyond the immediate body (p. 9). Schwarz’s progression from abstract teachings to concrete applications culminates in a highly informative account of the puberty ceremony. It is both effective and sensitive and provides an intriguing analysis of how Navajos structure their world, their persons, and their selves.

The story Schwarz traces is an eloquent one, interweaving the spoken prose of Navajo cultural teachers and Schwarz’s own careful writing. Her foregrounding of Navajo voices sets an example for future ethnographic work. By including her questions and comments in the dialogue, Schwarz submits her interview strategies to the reader’s scrutiny and divulgues how the knowledge and narrative were collectively constructed. As Marcus and Fischer note in Anthropology as Cultural Critique (University of Chicago Press, 1986), however, dialogic models may hide the ethnographer’s final, implicit authority. Still, Schwarz’s account is for the most part genuinely sensitive and deeply concerned with the primacy of Navajo voices.

The book is also a fine compendium of ethnographic information and covers topics often untouched in the Euro-American literature on Navajo, such as the different levels of traditional Navajo knowledge, the boy’s puberty ceremony, Navajo explanations of fertilization, etc. Her insights into the malleability of the Navajo body and its extension beyond corporeal boundaries are significant; those who seek to challenge anatomical models will find compelling support in Schwarz’s account. Schwarz is also adept at identifying present-day adaptations of traditional Navajo ceremonial knowledge and underscores a mantra of practice theory: cultural structures not only shape but are shaped by the cultural actors. In many regards, it is a tremendous work.

Yet Schwarz’s concern with “effect,” as well as a reliance on practice theory, are ultimately antagonistic to her analysis. First, it leaves intact the agendas of current theoretical trends, such as practice theory’s emphasis on individual agency/volition. In attempting to explain agency, Schwarz seems to accept Foucault’s association of power with knowledge (as the he states that power is based on knowledge [p. 14]) and so overlooks “power’s” other possible sources. For instance, Navajo meanings of “thought” (itsihákees), by which the universe was created, and “strength” (the dzil of the natural order) are left largely unexplored.

Second, Schwarz’s use of “effect” and “practice” assumes a universe comprised of discrete components (e.g., “effect” separates an initial causative event from a subsequent impact, and practice juxtaposes structure with individual action). This, in turn, necessitates the three metaphorical structures to “link” cause with effect, to link agency with structure, and to transform an atomistic universe into an integrated, “fluid” one. But, given the initial assumptions, the analysis will inevitably be stuck in a universe of discrete elements. In such a worldview, the deerskin...